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Abstract—The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) 
is a landing system for aircraft based on Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS). It consists of a reference station at an 
airport that generates corrections and integrity parameters that 
are transmitted to arriving aircraft. The broadcast is currently 
accomplished via a VHF data broadcast (VDB). In recent years it 
turned out that proper siting and frequency planning for the 
VDB is a challenging task in an operational environment. 
Coverage, as well as signal power issues, especially at large and 
complex airports have led to a number of considerations that 
have to be taken into account when installing VDB transmission 
antennas. Furthermore, current GBAS only broadcast 
corrections for the L1 frequency of GPS satellites. Availability 
issues, mainly due to ionospheric effects in equatorial regions, 
however, drive the development of expanding GBAS from a 
single frequency single constellation system towards a dual 
frequency multi constellation architecture. Transmitting 
additional corrections and integrity parameters at the same 
update rate is challenging due to the limited capacity of the VDB 
data link. Finally, transmission should offer the potential to 
provide secure transmissions with an authenticated signal in 
order to be robust also from a security perspective. For all these 
reasons it can be envisioned to provide the GBAS messages via 
LDACS which is currently in the process of standardization. This 
could resolve the issues mentioned and thus support GBAS 
implementation in the future. This paper provides an overview of 
the expected benefits mentioned above and provides a first 
performance estimation of GBAS over LDACS. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In order to cope with the ever-increasing amount of air traffic, 
several new technologies are developed that allow for more 
efficient and reliable communication, navigation and 
surveillance. These new technologies are enablers for a more 
efficient use of airspace and airport capacity. In this paper, the 
concept of using a new communication system (L-band 
Digital Aeronautical Communication System, LDACS) to 
support a new precision approach guidance system (GBAS) is 
explored, starting from a discussion of the current status and 
describing ongoing developments, future needs and the 
potential when bringing those technologies together. 
A. GBAS 
The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is 
currently providing CAT-I approach service (GBAS Approach 
Service Type (GAST) C in GBAS terminology) at a number of 
airports throughout the world (e.g. in Bremen and Frankfurt in 
Germany, Newark and Houston in the US, Zurich in 
Switzerland, Málaga in Spain, Sydney and Melbourne in 
Australia). Standards for GAST D (the service type also 
supporting CAT-II/III operations) were finalized by the end of 
2017 [1]. Operations using this service are expected in the 
2020 timeframe. A GBAS ground station consists of typically 
four reference receivers at carefully surveyed locations at the 
airport. These sites are selected to be far from any obstacles 
that might cause navigation errors caused by signal reflections. 
By precise knowledge of the reference positions corrections for 
the navigation signals coming from the satellites can be 
generated and transmitted to arriving aircraft. All the stations 
mentioned above are only providing corrections and integrity 
information for the L1 frequency of the GPS satellites. The 
most challenging task for a GBAS is to protect users against 
steep gradients in the ionospheric delay, the major error source 
in single frequency positioning with Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS) [2][3][4]. In GAST C it’s the ground 
station’s sole responsibility to ensure protection of the airborne 
users against this kind of threat. The architecture therefore 
makes very conservative assumptions and inflations of 
integrity parameters in order to ensure protection of users [5]. 
In GAST D the strategy was somewhat changed: In order to 
ensure reliable and timely detection of potentially hazardous 
ionospheric errors, a sophisticated architecture of monitors in 
the GBAS ground station and the airborne receiver using 
GBAS was developed. One of the consequences is, however, 
that the GBAS reference antennas cannot be placed freely. 
They rather have to be spaced very specifically and have to be 
orientated considering the orientation of the runways to which 
approach service is provided [6]. Together with the protection 
against multipath and the required distanced to reflecting 
objects such as buildings or shelters, siting a GBAS at an 
airport has turned out to be a highly challenging task. 
Furthermore, the GBAS concept as it is today only provides 
operationally acceptable availability in mid-latitudes where 
severe ionospheric activity is rare. In equatorial and polar 
regions the current integrity concept would result in very 
limited availability [7].  
B. LDACS 
The L-band Digital Aeronautical Communication System 
(LDACS) is a broadband air-ground datalink proposed to 
supplement the VHF communication infrastructure in the L-
band [8]. It is designed to provide air-ground data 
communication with optional support for digital voice. It is a 
cellular broadband system based on Orthogonal Frequency-
Division Multiplexing (OFDM) technology [9] and supports 
quality-of-service while taking the requirements of 
aeronautical services into account. Moreover, it shares many 
technical features with 3G and 4G wireless communications 
systems.  
The LDACS access network contains several ground 
stations in order to provide complete coverage. Each of the 
ground stations provides one LDACS radio cell for 
communication and ranging. 
The LDACS air interface is a cellular datalink with a star-
topology connecting aircraft to ground stations with a full 
duplex radio link. Each ground station is the centralized 
instance controlling all air-ground communications within its 
radio cell. An aircraft connects to one base station while 
periodically scanning other base stations for quick handovers 
as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: LDACS cellular concept.  
 
The LDACS protocol stack defines two layers, the physical 
layer and the data link layer. 
The physical layer provides the means to transfer data over 
the radio channel. The LDACS ground station supports bi-
directional links to multiple aircraft under its control. The 
forward link direction (FL; ground-to-air) and the reverse link 
direction (RL; air-to-ground) are separated by frequency 
division duplex. Forward link and reverse link use a 500 kHz 
channel each. The ground station transmits a continuous stream 
of OFDM symbols on the forward link. In the reverse link 
different aircraft are separated in time and frequency using a 
combination of orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access 
and time-division multiple-access. Aircraft thus transmit 
discontinuously on the reverse link with radio bursts sent in 
precisely defined transmission opportunities allocated by the 
ground station.  
The data-link layer provides the necessary protocols to 
facilitate concurrent and reliable data transfer for multiple 
users. The LDACS data link layer is organized in two sub-
layers: The medium access sub-layer and the logical link 
control sub-layer. The medium access sub-layer manages the 
organization of transmission opportunities in slots of time and 
frequency. The logical link control sub-layer provides reliable 
and acknowledged point-to-point logical channels between the 
aircraft and the ground station using an automatic repeat 
request protocol. 
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN GBAS 
With the introduction of the latest generation of GPS 
satellites (Block IIF) a new signal was introduced in the L5 
frequency band, a band usable for aeronautical navigation. This 
new feature now enables efficient mitigation of the ionospheric 
threat by using dual frequency methods and either remove the 
ionospheric delay or enable effective monitoring for 
ionospheric gradients between the ground station and airborne 
users. The European Galileo constellation provides signals on 
the same two frequencies on all the satellites and the remaining 
satellites to complete the constellation are planned to be 
launched in the coming years. Additionally, also the Russian 
Glonass is currently being modernized and the Chinese Beidou 
is launching satellites at a high rate. This means that within the 
next few years there will be more than 100 GNSS satellites 
available for navigation, many of them providing dual 
frequency capability. It is therefore a natural evolution of 
GBAS to extend from single frequency single constellation to 
dual frequency and multi-constellation services. It is expected 
that this service will make GBAS usable in all regions of the 
world, including regions with active ionospheric conditions and 
remove many of the siting constraints that currently persist.  
GBAS installations use the VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) in 
order to provide approaching aircraft with differential 
corrections, integrity parameters and approach definitions. This 
data link operates via time division multiple access (TDMA) 
on frequencies ranging between 108 and 118 MHz. For this, 
VDB divides each second into two frames, and each frame into 
8 slots. Per frame, each slot can be assigned to a ground 
installation individually. This way, multiple GBAS 
installations can jointly operate on the same frequency. 
An airborne user equipped with a GBAS receiver, has to 
receive the VDB data as well as GNSS data. The parameters 
transmitted via VDB and the received GNSS data are then used 
for calculating a position solution and for providing path 
guidance, meeting all requirements for precision approaches 
with the different service levels. 
For reliable GBAS services, sufficient VDB coverage is 
operationally crucial and has to be considering when planning 
for a new GBAS installation. The VDB field strength 
requirements (minimum and maximum thresholds) are tested 
during initial and periodic flight inspection of a GBAS 
installation for the whole coverage area. Due to additional strict 
siting constraints, it can be very challenging to find a suitable 
location for the installation of a single VDB transmit antenna 
for complex airports. This is why the newest ICAO GBAS 
documents allow for multiple VDB transmitters to be used. In 
such a setup, the VDB transmitters operate in distinct slots, so 
that the required capacity is reduced, however signal coverage 
is ensured so that the intended operations can be supported.  
For future GBAS services, however, the restriction to this 
data link poses a significant bottleneck as will be described 
more in detail shortly. 
Another issue of GBAS is its susceptibility to spoofed VDB 
signals. In order to mitigate this security-related threat, the 
GBAS authentication feature has been added to the GBAS 
standards lately, being optional for current GAST-C services 
and mandatory only for GAST-D. However, some threat 
scenarios are not completely mitigated by this approach. 
LDACS, being a digital broadband datalink designed for air 
traffic management, may provide a viable approach to 
overcome these issues.  
A. Support of multiple constellations and frequencies 
Within the European research program SESAR (work 
package 15.3.7), a concept for transmitting corrections and 
additional integrity parameters for two frequencies and two 
constellations was developed [10]. In order to remain 
backwards compatible with GAST C and D, any additional 
messages providing corrections and integrity parameters for 
additional constellations and signals from a second frequency 
have to fit into the remaining space within the specified VDB 
message format. The maximum capacity of the current VDB is 
limited to 3552 Bytes per second. While it is possible to 
transmit corrections and integrity parameters for two 
constellations at the currently specified update rate of 2 Hz, it 
may already be impossible to transmit corrections and integrity 
parameters for all satellites in view if it is intended to provide 
corrections for three constellations. Other scenarios under 
consideration (such as e.g. two transmitters on a shared 
frequency due to frequency availability) may further restrict 
capacity and require a slower update rate of the corrections. 
This then impacts all integrity considerations and requires 
significant additional effort in the development phase.  
Transmitting the corrections and integrity parameters via 
LDACS could resolve the capacity issue. For safe GBAS 
operations, GBAS messages need to be received by an 
approaching aircraft continuously for the defined coverage 
volume. In general, GBAS over LDACS has to at least 
maintain the same level of safety compared with the current 
VDB. This leads to two constraints for GBAS over LDACS: 
On the one hand, the percentage of missed GBAS messages 
must be limited. This implies that LDACS messages must be 
receivable by any approaching aircraft throughout the complete 
GBAS service volume. This is in line with the VDB coverage 
volume requirements. 
On the other hand, the message integrity needs to be 
ensured. For VDB, cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) and 
forward error corrections (FEC) are used to ensure that 
transmission errors cannot affect the GBAS processing. 
LDACS employs similar techniques to ensure data integrity 
and coverage and is thus in principle a suitable alternative to 
the VDB.  
With the increased capacity of LDACS, GBAS could be 
able to support additional services in the future. For multi-
constellation and multi-frequency GBAS, LDACS could 
enable transmitting corrections and integrity parameters for the 
four global core constellations and two frequencies 
simultaneously as will be shown in the Results section in more 
detail. It would thus eliminate some of the drawbacks of the 
currently developed GBAS service types that exist only due to 
the VDB limitations previously described. 
LDACS is a broadband communication system designed to 
support a wide range of aeronautical applications in the airport, 
TMA, and en-route airspaces. The current LDACS 
specification [11] foresees 300 kbps up to 1.3 Mbit, depending 
on the configuration, in the ground-to-air direction, thus 
offering sufficient spare communication capacity for GBAS 
correction data of multiple constellations. It should also be 
noted, that if LDACS has already been deployed for ATM 
communication, no additional deployment is necessary for 
GBAS correction data. We assume in this paper that the 
coverage and integrity of an LDACS deployment certified for 
safety and regularity of flight communication would also be 
sufficient for GBAS service. 
B. Potential to improve coverage at complex airports 
Operational experience showed that siting a GBAS VDB 
transmitter is a highly complex task. Especially at large and 
complex airports it is extremely challenging to provide 
sufficient coverage at all runways with a single VDB 
transmitter. 
LDACS could potentially overcome the coverage issue 
since the system is cell-based and designed to be robust against 
multipath interference common in the airport domain. LDACS' 
robust signal considerably improves the availability of 
correction data in the airport domain, however, if sufficient 
coverage still cannot be achieved, additional LDACS cells can 
be deployed. Since LDACS is a cell-based system by design, it 
supports automatic and seamless handovers between cells 
using different frequencies. That is, additional LDACS cells, 
e.g. for improved coverage, do not reduce the communication 
capacity of other cells as it was proposed in [10] for the case of 
shared VDB frequencies 
C. Possibility to add a security layer 
Finally, there is an increasing wish to protect critical 
infrastructure from interference and make it robust against any 
potential external influence. One component of a GBAS 
security program is to provide a secure and authenticated 
GBAS message in order to ensure that the received message at 
the aircraft was generated by the GBAS ground station at the 
airport and is unaltered.  
LDACS is currently being updated in the context of the 
Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) to fully support 
cyber security. The updated specification will support 
authentication, integrity, encryption, and non-repudiation. 
Although encryption may not be of interest for GBAS 
correction data, the application of authentication and integrity 
would guarantee that correction data comes from a legitimate 
source and has not been altered. 
III. GBAS OVER LDACS 
A. Approach 
The initial approach of this study is to transmit GBAS 
correction information over LDACS in exactly the same VDB 
message types and formats as currently proposed for dual 
frequency dual constellation GBAS within the SESAR project. 
Thus, for a single GBAS installation we assume the messages 
and message sizes according to [10] and as illustrated in 
Figure 2 as baseline for our simulations. Note, that the VDB   
slot structure displayed in the figure is, however, not relevant 
for transmitting GBAS over LDACS and is therefore not 
considered. The message types contain the corrections for the 
GNSS pseudorange measurements, integrity parameters to 
enable error bounding at the aircraft, and approach reference 
coordinates describing the approach trajectory and runway 
geometry. It should be noted here that this concept is not 
necessarily to be seen as the final transmission scheme that 
will be used as the development is still ongoing. Furthermore, 
when operating with a data link such as LDACS, some of the 
capacity restrictions would be obsolete, the alternating 
transmission concept for two VDB transmitters at complex 
airports would not be required and other optimizations would 
be possible regarding the message structure. Such an 
optimization is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and 
subject to future work after this higher-level feasibility study 
and a discussion of potential benefits.  
 
 
We assume that these messages would be provided to the 
LDACS ground radio at 2 Hz for transmission similar to VDB. 
Contrary to VDB we assume no slot structure. The messages 
would be transmitted via LDACS as binary data packets 
statistically multiplexed into the packets of other air 
management communication services. 
In our approach GBAS packet transmitted via LDACS as 
broadcast packets and not as addressed packets. This implies 
that GBAS packets will suffer from uncorrected transmission 
errors according to the bit error rate of LDACS after forward 
error correction. Note that uncorrected bit errors are detected 
by the check sums transparently added by LDACS and can 
therefore be safely discarded. 
 
Figure 2: GBAS message types (MT), for number of 
satellites (N) and maximum size of message (in B) 
transmitted via VDB according to [10]. Note that the Slot 
structure is an artefact of the technical implementation of 
VDB and does not apply to LDACS.  
B. LDACS Security Concept 
The LDACS Security Concept follows five objectives 
namely that (1) the operation of the LDACS system security 
functions shall not diminish the ability of the LDACS system 
to operate safely and effectively, (2) the LDACS system shall 
support reliability and robustness to mitigate denial of service 
attacks, (3) the LDACS system shall support message 
authentication and integrity to prevent message alteration 
attacks, (4) the LDACS system should support encryption to 
mitigate eavesdropping and (5) the LDACS system shall 
support entity authentication to mitigate impersonation attacks 
[12]. For transmitting GBAS messages securely over LDACS 
especially (3) and (5) are important, as the end nodes of 
communication as well as message integrity, authenticity and 
timeliness must be protected. 
Thus first, we need to make sure that only legitimate 
participants in our communication system are transmitting. 
Therefore we need ways for entities to authenticate to each 
other so that trust between parties can be established. We 
propose to fulfill this goal via introducing a Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and handing out certificates to all 
necessary entities in a chain-of-trust form. Following ideas of 
the AeroMACS PKI [13], the root of trust lies with an offline 
root certificate authority (CA) issuing compliant sub-CAs. The 
online Sub-CAs can be used for governmental applications 
and form a chain of Sub-CAs with the End-Entity Certificates 
for the terminal being the end of that chain. Those certificates 
can be uploaded onto aircraft or ground stations e.g. on 
dedicated maintenance events by authorized staff [13].  
When all participants have received their End-Entity 
Certificate, allowing for global interoperability, and are 
integrated into the LDACS PKI, they can mutually 
authenticate to each other. Consequently, we have made sure 
that every party providing information to LDACS or are 
transceiving via LDACS, are identified and recognized as a 
certain entity by all other parts of the system. One way to 
achieve this exchange and to also establish key material 
among communicating parties is the Station to Station (STS) 
protocol, thus at the end of the exchange, parties can trust each 
other and derivate keys for certain tasks from the acquired key 
material. 
This is the groundwork to achieve message integrity, 
authenticity and timeliness. Implementation wise, LDACS 
provides a variation of the TESLA authentication broadcast 
protocol [14]. Given that transmitting nodes in the LDACS 
system are mutually authenticated, have negotiated key 
material to derive an arbitrary number of keys and are at least 
loosely time synchronized, using the TESLA broadcast 
authentication protocol allows us to securely transmit GBAS 
over LDACS. 
Thus, we conclude that the cyber security architecture 
provided by LDACS guarantees that correction data comes 
from a legitimate source and has not been altered. 
 
C. Evaluation 
We evaluate GBAS over LDACS on the basis of 
communication evaluation scenarios developed by 
EUROCONTROL and FAA for the Future Communication 
Infrastructure (FCI) [15]. The FCI scenarios provide detailed 
evaluation scenarios for the airport (APT Zone), terminal 
maneuvering area (TMA), en-route (ENR), and 
oceanic/remote/polar (ORP) airspaces. GBAS messages need 
to be received within the GBAS service volume around the 
airport, on all approach paths and on all runways in order to 
support roll-out guidance. We therefore focus on the TMA and 
APT zone.  
The FCI defines several rectangular TMA evaluation 
scenarios ("service volumes") according to their size from 25 x 
25 nautical miles up to 75 x 75 nautical miles. For each of 
these scenarios the expected aircraft population and air traffic 
management communication load is defined. Since the radius 
of a GBAS service volume is 23 nautical miles we evaluate 
only FCI scenarios that are similar in size or larger as the 
GBAS service volume as illustrated in Figure 3: TMA 45x45 
nm, TMA 60x60 nm, and TMA 75x75 nm. The air traffic 
communication load is defined through a set of air traffic 
control and airline operational communication applications1.  
In our evaluation we assume that GBAS data would come on 
top of the air traffic management traffic. 
Note that the FCI evaluation scenarios define only service 
volumes, i.e. the number of aircraft to be serviced and the 
amount of data traffic to be handled, but do not make any 
assumptions on the underlying communication infrastructure.  
In this paper we assume that an LDACS cell providing 
GBAS correction data would cover the vicinity of one airport, 
thus covering one APT Zone and the TMA service volumes 
We have therefore added the service load of the APT service 
volume to the respective TMA service volume in our 
evaluation. This is illustrated in Figure 4. We assume that en-
route communication services would be provided by additional 
long-range LDACS cells that are not considered in our 
simulation. Further we assume in out simulations the 
anticipated "nominal" bit error rate of 10-6 after forward error 
correction. In addition to forward error correction, LDACS 
uses 32-bit cyclic redundancy checks for error detection.  Since 
GBAS packets are broadcast in our simulation we apply no 
retransmission mechanism i.e. GBAS packets are sent using the 
unacknowledged data link service of LDACS. Packets detected 
to be corrupted by the CRC are silently discarded. The duration 
of our simulations is 3.600 seconds with additional 50 seconds 
of ramp-up and ramp-down time, each, that are not taken into 
account. 
                                                           
1 In this paper we considered the addressed FCI communication services for 
phase II: Air traffic services: ACL, ACM, AMC, ARMAND, COTRAC, D-
ALERT, D-ATIS, DCL, D-FLUP, DLL, D-ORIS, D-OTIS, DRV-R, DSC, D-
SIG, D-SIGMET, D-TAXI, DYNAV, FLIPCY, FLIPINT, PPD, SAP, URCO; 
Airline operational communication: AOCDLL, CABINLOG, ENGINE, 
FLTLOG, FLTPLAN, FLTSTAT, FREETXT, FUEL, GATES, LOADSHT, 
MAINTPR, MAINTRT, NOTAM, OOOI, POSRPT, SWLOAD, TECHLOG, 
UPLIB, WXGRAPH, WXRT, WXTEXT; Network services: NETCONN, 
NETKEEP. The broadcast services are not included: A-EXEC, AIRSEP 
SURV, C&P SURV, ITP SURV, M&S SURV, PAIRAPP SURV, C&P ACL, 
ITP ACL, PAIRAPP ACL, M&S ACL, SURV ATC, WAKE. 
 
TMA 75 x 75 nm
TMA 60 x 60 nm
TMA 45 x 45 nm
LDACS cell
GBAS service volume
 
Figure 3: FCI terminal maneuvering area (TMA) service 
volumes covering a GBAS service volume (innermost) 
inside an LDACS cell (outermost). Note that the figure is 
not drawn to scale and that the radius of the LDACS cell 
may be up to 200 nautical miles. 
 
Figure 4: The evaluation scenarios in this paper (left) are 
the union of TMA and APT Zone service volumes (right) 
as defined in [15]. 
 
We perform our evaluation of GBAS over LDACS in a 
computer simulation called Framework for Aeronautical 
Communications and Traffic Simulations 2 (FACTS2). 
Reference [16] provides a detailed description of FACTS2 and 
the implementation of the air traffic and data traffic simulation. 
For the evaluation of GBAS over LDACS we used the 
following two requirements derived from the Time to Alert 
(TA) requirement of GBAS (1.5 seconds): 
Requirement 1: Each GBAS message must be received 
successfully at least once within 1.5 seconds. In this way it is 
ensured that the required time to alarm allocated to the GBAS 
ground system is not exceeded (according to the GAST D 
SARPS section 7.5.12.3 GBAS signal-in-space time-to-alert, 
Table D5-B [1]).  
Requirement 2: A GBAS message is only considered 
received successfully (in addition to being successfully and 
correctly received by LDACS) if it is not older than 1.5 
seconds. This requirement addresses the fact that corrections 
may not be “too old” when processed at the aircraft. This 
message time-out at aircraft requirement is also given in the 
same table as the ground system TTA above. 
Both requirements must be fulfilled simultaneously. The 
LDACS security concept for GBAS is not evaluated by 
simulation in this paper. 
IV. RESULTS 
This section presents the results obtained by our simulations 
with the assumptions and against the requirements described 
in the previous section.  
 
Requirement 1: The result is calculated from the bit error rate 
(10-6) and the packet size. The performance criterion evaluated 
is P(3 lost packets in a row at 2 Hz packet rate) which is the 
probability to violate requirement 1. The following table 
presents the results per message type: 
 
Service P( Requirement 1 violated) 
GBAS MT11 (N=10) 3.00E-07 
GBAS MT11 (N=18) 1.38E-06 
GBAS MT1 (N=10) 1.03E-06 
GBAS MT1 (N=18) 4.96E-06 
GBAS MT2 6.75E-08 
GBAS MT4 6.75E-08 
GBAS MT42 (N=9) 1.19E-06 
GBAS MT50 1.24E-08 
 
 
Requirement 2: The results shown in the next table are 
computed assuming GBAS data transmission over LDACS 
together with air traffic management communication services. 
Note that these results are for the FL (=ground to air) only, 
since the RL is on a separate radio channel and does not carry 
GBAS data. Management data for the RL, e.g. 
acknowledgements for RL retransmissions, are however taken 
into account. The results were calculated and are shown for 
the three different sizes of the TMA in addition to the APT 
zone. 
 
 
 Service Load 
(kbit/s) 
95% 
percentile 
latency (ms) 
99% 
percentile 
latency (ms) 
AP
T 
Zo
ne
 +
 T
M
A 
45
x4
5 
ATM (broadcast) 7.66 - - 
ATM (addressed) 36.47 - - 
GBAS MT11 (N=10) 1.31 113.00 148.00 
GBAS MT11 (N=18) 2.18 113.00 131.00 
GBAS MT1 (N=10) 1.98 113.00 148.00 
GBAS MT1 (N=18) 3.35 113.00 129.00 
GBAS MT2 0.79 113.00 113.00 
GBAS MT4 0.79 113.00 131.00 
GBAS MT42 (N=9) 2.07 113.00 129.00 
GBAS MT50 0.9 113.00 129.00 
AP
T 
Zo
ne
 +
 
TM
A
 6
0x
60
 ATM (broadcast) 8.06 - - 
ATM (addressed) 37.19 - - 
GBAS MT11 (N=10) 1.31 113.00 149.00 
GBAS MT11 (N=18) 2.18 113.00 133.00 
GBAS MT1 (N=10) 1.98 113.00 149.00 
GBAS MT1 (N=18) 3.35 113.00 133.00 
GBAS MT2 0.79 113.00 129.00 
GBAS MT4 0.79 113.00 133.00 
GBAS MT42 (N=9) 2.07 113.00 133.00 
GBAS MT50 0.9 113.00 131.00 
AP
T 
Zo
ne
 +
 T
M
A 
75
x7
5 
ATM (broadcast) 8.54 - - 
ATM (addressed) 38.18 - - 
GBAS MT11 (N=10) 1.31 113.00 168.00 
GBAS MT11 (N=18) 2.18 113.00 149.00 
GBAS MT1 (N=10) 1.98 113.00 168.00 
GBAS MT1 (N=18) 3.35 113.00 148.00 
GBAS MT2 0.79 113.00 129.00 
GBAS MT4 0.79 113.00 149.00 
GBAS MT42 (N=9) 2.07 113.00 148.00 
GBAS MT50 0.90 113.00 148.00 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
The results presented in this paper show that is generally 
feasible to use LDACS as communication link for transmitting 
GBAS corrections, integrity parameters and approach 
reference coordinates.  
The scenario chosen as baseline for the simulations 
assumes a transmission scheme that was designed to 
specifically serve the constraints of the VDB data link 
currently used by GBAS. Further optimizations (e.g. use of 
larger messages, different allocations, optimized use of slots, 
etc.) were beyond the scope of this paper. They will change 
the obtained results, however, as a study of feasibility the 
concept was evaluated with the current transmission scheme. 
In order to ensure integrity, a GBAS message (transmitted 
at a rate of 2Hz) must be received at least once every 1.5 
seconds and the received corrections may not be older than 1.5 
seconds. The results showed that the probability to not receive 
the GBAS message at least once every 1.5s depends on the 
message type and is in the range of 1E-06 to 1E-08. The 
latency of the LDACS messages is in the range of just up to 
168ms for the 99th percentile for the TMA 75x75 zone, with 
the exact value again depending on the message type. These 
results would support the intended operation.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presented the idea of providing the GBAS 
messages via the new LDACS data link instead of the 
currently used VDB.  
The main advantages are that  
(1) There is no significant restriction of the capacity 
w.r.t. the amount of data to be transmitted. This is 
especially helpful in the development of future multi 
constellation and dual frequency service types that 
would require a higher data rate than today’s 
operations GBAS in order to provide improved 
availability.  
(2) Furthermore, it may be easier to ensure sufficient 
coverage at large and complex airports by the cell-
based technology as opposed to a single VDB 
transmit antenna or a dual VDB architecture. This 
would remove several current operational constraints 
on the GBAS operation.   
(3) And finally, LDACS by design supports 
authentication protocols that may be desirable for 
future systems in order to provide authenticated 
GBAS messages to the users. 
 
These benefits strongly support further investigating 
transmitting GBAS data via LDACS. 
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